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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tarango Deforest Padilla appeals from the district court’s judgment, on
remand, entered upon the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
in which the court again determined that Padilla is not entitled to post-conviction
relief on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress evidence obtained up to, and as part of, Padilla’s lawful detention.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts underlying Padilla’s
criminal convictions as follows:
At approximately 2:30 a.m. one morning in August 2009,
Officer Matthew Gonzales, who was on routine patrol driving
through an alley, saw Padilla and attempted to make contact with
him. Padilla fled and was subsequently found nearby lying on the
ground under a tree. During a search of Padilla, officers found two
financial transaction cards (cards) that did not belong to Padilla and
several spark plug pieces.[FN] Officers found additional cards,
spark plug pieces, and a flashlight upon searching the area where
Padilla was pursued and ultimately detained. Police contacted the
owners of two of the cards, who both confirmed they left their cards
in their respective unlocked vehicles the night before and the cards
were missing. Both victims denied knowing Padilla or giving him
permission to use the cards.
Padilla was charged with two counts of grand theft, Idaho
Code §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b), and with being a persistent
violator, I.C. § 19-2514, in separate cases later consolidated for
trial. . . .
The jury found Padilla guilty as charged.
FN. Officer Gonzales testified at trial that from his training,
he was aware that ceramic spark plug pieces are often used
by criminals to easily break car windows. He testified he did
not know of any legitimate reason a person would have such
1

items on his person.
State v. Padilla, Docket Nos. 38899-38900, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 777
at p.2 (Idaho App. Dec. 28, 2012).
Padilla filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in both cases and
alleged, among other claims, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to suppress. (#41772/#41773 R.1, pp.13-21, 191-199.) Padilla also filed
a motion for the appointment of counsel, which the district court granted.
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.22-26, 200-204.) The court thereafter notified Padilla of
its intent to dismiss his petition. (#41772/#41773 R., pp.27-28, 205-206.) With
respect to Padilla’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
suppression motion, the court advised Padilla that he failed to identify, in his
petition, any basis for suppression.

(#41772/#41773 R., pp.27, 205.)

In

response, Padilla, with the assistance of counsel, filed an amended petition.
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.46-49, 53-58, 232-237.) In his amended petition, Padilla
alleged, in relevant part, that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to
suppress, which motion he asserted should have been based on an allegedly
illegal “Terry stop” and statements “made to police without a Miranda warning.”
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.54, 233.)

The state filed an answer and a separate

motion for summary dismissal. (#41772/#41773 R., pp.59-61, 70-90, 238-241,
252-273.)

The state also filed a motion to take judicial notice of several

1

The Idaho Supreme Court entered an order augmenting the record on appeal in
this case with the “Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s Transcript filed electronically
with this Court in consolidated appeal Nos. 41772 and 41773, Padilla v. State
(Twin Falls County Nos. CV-2013-1782 and CV-2013-1783).” (7/14/15 Order
Augmenting Consolidated Appeals.)
2

documents related to Padilla’s underlying criminal cases, as did Padilla.2
(#41772/#41773 R., pp.67-69 (state’s motion), 94-141 (Padilla’s motion and
attachments), 146-148 (state’s amended motion).)
Although the state requested summary dismissal, the court did not rule on
that motion but instead conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Padilla
withdrew his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress based on Miranda, but maintained his claim that suppression should
have been sought based on the alleged absence of reasonable articulable
suspicion to support his detention as required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). (#41772/#41773 Tr., p.15, L.24 – p.16, L.9.) After the hearing, the court
entered a written decision denying relief and a separate Judgment dismissing
Padilla’s petition. (#41772/#41773 R., pp.154-165, 288-299.) On this claim, the
district court stated, in relevant part:
Even assuming that there was no basis for a Terry stop/frisk as
Padilla suggests, police would have had the right to search him
following his arrest on the warrant. This doctrine coupled with the
inevitable discovery doctrine would have resulted in denial of any
suppression motion. He further argues that a flashlight found near
the scene should have been suppressed. The flashlight was not
found on his person. Padilla has made no showing that he had any
expectation of privacy in this item. Any suppression motion
regarding this item would have been futile.

2

At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the court addressed the parties’ request
for judicial notice and ultimately admitted the documents that were the subject of
the parties’ motions as exhibits. (#41772/#41773 Tr., p.5, L.21 – p.8, L.4.)
3

(#41772/#41773 R., pp.162, 294.)

Padilla filed a timely notice of appeal.3

(#41772/#41773 R., pp.167-169, 301-302.)
Padilla raised a single issue in his post-conviction appeal: Whether the
district court erred in denying relief on Padilla’s claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a motion to suppress. (#41772/#41773 Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
More specifically, Padilla argued counsel should have requested suppression
based

on

the

alleged

lack

of

reasonable

suspicion

to

detain

him.

(#41772/#41773 Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.) The Court of Appeals first found that
because the “evidence at issue originated from the search that occurred prior to
the discovery of the arrest warrant . . . if the seizure of Padilla was unlawful, then
the evidence resulting from the search prior to the discovery of the search
warrant would not be admissible under the attenuation doctrine because the
unearthing of the arrest warrant was not an intervening circumstance.” Padilla v.
State, 158 Idaho 184, 188-189, 345 P.3d 243, 247-248 (Ct. App. 2014).
Addressing the legality of the seizure, the Court of Appeals concluded the district
court failed to make findings necessary to resolve the factual disputes related to
the “failure to file a motion to suppress theory” raised by Padilla and failed to
make “conclusions of law in relation to this theory, except to say that the
evidence would have been admissible even If the investigatory stop were

3

Although technically two separate cases, Padilla’s single petition filed in relation
to both underlying criminal cases was litigated in the same proceeding and the
cases have been consolidated on appeal. (#41772/#41773 R., pp.177-178, 314315; #41772/#41773 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-14 (court noting that the cases were “set for
hearing at the same time on the docket because they are companion cases”).)
4

unlawful.” Id. at 191, 345 P.3d at 250.4 The factual disputes identified by the
Court of Appeals included the officer’s observations of Padilla’s behavior as
compared to Padilla’s claims about what he thought, saw, and heard (or did not
hear). Id. “Thus,” the Court “remand[ed] the case to the district court to make
the requisite factual findings.” Id. “With these factual findings,” the Court of
Appeals advised the district court it “could also make conclusions of law including
(a) whether it would have been objectively reasonable for defense counsel to file
a motion to suppress, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion under the
totality of the circumstances, and (b) whether there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had counsel filed
a motion to suppress.” Id.
The state filed a petition for review. (#41772/#41773 Respondent’s Brief in
Support of Petition for Review.) The basis for the state’s request was that the
record and the applicable law showed there were no relevant factual disputes for
the district court to resolve because the standard under the Fourth Amendment
for investigatory detentions is an objective one that is based on the information
available to the officer, not Padilla’s thoughts or his reasons for fleeing. (Id. at
11.) The state also noted the Court of Appeals’ erroneous statement that, on
remand, the district court could make a “conclusion[ ] of law” about “whether it
would have been objectively reasonable for defense counsel to file a motion to

4

The Court of Appeals declined to consider the state’s assertion that the “officers
had probable cause to arrest Padilla based on their finding financial transaction
cards and ceramic spark plug pieces on the ground near Padilla” because the
claim was made at oral argument and was not considered by the district court.
Id. at 188 n.3, 345 P.3d at 247 n.3.
5

suppress,” Padilla, 158 Idaho at 191, 345 P.3d at 250, because the correct
standard is whether counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, not
whether it would have been objectively reasonable for him to do something
different.5 (#41772/#41773 Respondent’s Brief in Support of Petition for Review,
p.21 n.5.)

The Idaho Supreme Court denied the state’s request for review.

(#41772/#41773 Order Denying Petition for Review.)
On remand, the state filed a motion to dismiss and asked the district court
to “make factual findings based upon the record before the court, and
conclusions of law based on those factual findings.” (R., pp.31, 106.) Padilla
filed a response after which the court entered its “Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.” (R., pp.48-62, 123-137.) The district court entered an
“Amended Judgment” again dismissing Padilla’s petition and Padilla timely
appealed. (R., pp.63-68, 138-142.)

5

Padilla concedes that “the Court of Appeals’ statement of the law sets a new
standard more favorable to petitioners than the Strickland standard,” but
contends it is “law of the case.” (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.8-9.) Padilla,
however, cites no authority that actually supports the proposition that a party is
entitled to application of an incorrect legal standard. (Id.) The state will,
therefore, address Padilla’s arguments under the correct standard as Padilla has
also done “[i]n an abundance of caution.” (Id. at 9.)
6

ISSUE
Padilla states the issue on appeal as:
Did the District Court err in denying Mr. Padilla’s petition for postconviction relief because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
move to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence?
(Opening Brief of Appellant (“Appellant’s Brief”), p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Do the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law support its
conclusion that Padilla is not entitled to relief on his post-conviction claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained
up to, and as part of, Padilla’s lawful detention?

7

ARGUMENT
Padilla Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court’s Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law, Entered Following Remand, On Padilla’s Claim That
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File A Suppression Motion That Would
Have Been Denied
A.

Introduction
Padilla contends the district court’s factual findings and conclusions of law

do not support its conclusion that Padilla was not entitled to relief on his claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress based on an
allegedly unlawful detention.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-19.)

Application of the

correct legal standards to the evidence presented shows Padilla has failed to
meet his burden of showing error. The district court correctly concluded that a
motion to suppress would have been denied.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil

proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.” McKay v. State, 148 Idaho
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834,
838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)).
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).
8

A trial court’s decision that a post-

conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108,
110 (Ct. App. 2003).
C.

Padilla Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To File A Suppression Motion
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-

conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). With respect to the
deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated
the defendant’s burden under Strickland as follows:
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a
conviction must show that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a claim
of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that
counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. The challenger’s burden is to show that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citations and quotations
omitted).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. “A reasonable probability
9

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citations
and quotations omitted). When a post-conviction petitioner claims his counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a motion in his underlying criminal case, the court
“may consider the probability of success of the motion in question in determining
whether the attorney’s inactivity constituted incompetent performance.” Sanchez
v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995); see also
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (“Where defense counsel’s
failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal
allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth
Amendment claim is meritorious . . ..”).

“Where the alleged deficiency is

counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would
not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs
of the test.” Sanchez, 127 Idaho at 713, 905 P.2d at 646. “If the motion lacked
merit and would have been denied, counsel ordinarily would not be deficient for
failing to pursue it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not have been
prejudiced by the want of his pursuit.” Id.
On remand, the district court made the following factual findings with
respect to Padilla’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress based upon Padilla’s allegedly unlawful detention:
Near 2 A.M. on the date of his arrest Padilla left the home of
an acquaintance to walk to his home approximately two blocks
away. As he walked down an alleyway he heard a vehicle come at
him at a “rate of speed that startled” him. That vehicle was in fact a
police cruiser. The police car, operated by Officer Gonzales, did
not initially have its headlights or overhead lights on. The police
officer was “patrolling” the alley way as part of his regular duties.
Gonzales observed that Padilla was “shuffling” and doing some
10

“fumbling around”. Gonzales turned on his headlights, but not his
overhead lights. He turned his vehicle so that Padilla could see
that it was a clearly marked police car. Padilla “turned and looked”
at Gonzales as he was getting out of his police car. Padilla thought
that he was going to “get jumped” by someone and began running.
Gonzales shouted at Padilla several times to stop. Padilla didn’t
hear the officer say stop. Rather, he continued running. He
jumped over a fence and twisted his ankle and fell in some bushes.
As he lay in the bushes after he fell, he “tossed everything that [he]
thought [he] didn’t want found on [him] in the bushes.” These items
included a credit card and pieces of a spark plug.
Another police officer, Officer Schlund, heard Gonzales radio
call for assistance and located Padilla where he had fallen. He was
immediately handcuffed. He was patted down for weapons but no
weapons were found. While Padilla was detained by other officers,
Gonzales searched the area where Padilla had been. He found a
credit card belonging to Mr. Mauch, some money, and some
ceramic pieces from a spark plug.[FN] Gonzales knew based upon
his training and experience that spark plugs can be used to break
windows on automobiles. All of these found items “were clean and
appeared to have just been placed there.” Gonzales then searched
Padilla’s person without a warrant and found two credit cards
belonging to Ms. Labrum and some more pieces of a spark plug.
The three credit cards and the spark plug pieces from Padilla’s
person were admitted as evidence at trial. The pieces of the spark
plug found on the ground were also admitted. [Footnote omitted.]
After finding these items Gonzales retraced the direction that
Padilla came from and found a flashlight in the yard that he chased
Padilla through. This item was also admitted at trial.
[FN]

The record is unclear whether Gonzales found more than
one credit card next to Padilla in the bushes, but it is clear
that none of the credit cards found that evening belonged to
Padilla.
(R., pp.55-56.)
The district court also made several conclusions of law, including: (1) the
evidentiary items found on the ground near Padilla would not have been
suppressed because Padilla abandoned the items or, to the extent he disclaimed
ownership, he had no standing to seek suppression of them; (2) the investigatory
11

detention was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion; and (3) the officers
had probable cause to arrest Padilla and search him incident to that arrest. (R.,
pp.56-61.)
Padilla contends the district court’s legal conclusion regarding the
detention is incorrect, claiming that “[t]o use flight as a ground for suspicion to
support the seizure, the State had the burden to show that (1) [he] knew the
police were present; and (2) that the police believed that he was aware of their
presence.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.) This argument fails.
It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. State v. Gallegos, 120
Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The
“reasonable suspicion” standard is an objective test that is satisfied if law
enforcement can articulate specific facts which, along with the reasonable
inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that the person detained is or
has been involved in criminal activity. State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408,
973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999); Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 821 P.2d at
951-952. Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951. Although a series of facts
may appear innocent when viewed separately, they may warrant further
investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42
P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001).

“Whether an officer possessed reasonable

suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
12

officer at or before the time of the stop.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811,
203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2008) (citation omitted).
Unprovoked flight is a highly relevant factor to be considered in analyzing
whether there is reasonable articulable suspicion to support an investigatory
detention. In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the Supreme Court
aptly noted: “Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of
evasion:

It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly

suggestive of such.” Thus, while an individual undoubtedly has “a right to ignore
the police and go about his business” when an officer approaches and doing so
does not provide a justification for a detention or seizure, “unprovoked flight is
simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not ‘going
about one’s business’; in fact, it is just the opposite.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
“Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate
further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to
stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.” Id.
After “shuffling” and “fumbling around” in an alley at around 2:00 in the
morning, and upon noticing Officer Gonzales’ patrol car, Padilla fled –
unprovoked. Although Officer Gonzales was going to attempt to make contact
with Padilla after seeing him in the alley, Officer Gonzales did not detain Padilla
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment until after Padilla’s unprovoked “headlong
flight” and subsequent discovery of him in the bushes. See State v. Agundis, 127
Idaho 587, 593, 903 P.2d 752, 758 (Ct. App. 1995) (an individual is not seized
until he submits to law enforcement’s show of authority).
13

“[C]ommonsense

judgments and inferences about human behavior” gave Officer Gonzales
reasonable suspicion to detain Padilla and confirm or dispel any suspicion that
he had been engaged in criminal activity. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (citation
omitted). Padilla’s entire behavior, from “shuffling” and “fumbling around” in the
alley at around 2:00 in the morning, to fleeing when he saw Officer Gonzales, to
“laying” in the bushes, was more than adequate to give Officer Gonzales
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him.
Padilla’s assertion that the state has the burden of proving he “knew the
police were present” and “that the police believed that he was aware of their
presence” is based on the Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Kreps, 650
N.W.2d 636 (Iowa 2002). The Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion on what is required
is, of course, not binding on this Court. Even accepting Kreps as persuasive
authority, Padilla’s assertion regarding the state’s alleged burden of proof is not
entirely accurate. The state is not required to show that Padilla in fact knew the
police were present. As correctly noted elsewhere in Padilla’s brief, what the
court in Kreps said was that “[f]or flight to constitute grounds for suspicion, the
circumstances surrounding the suspect’s efforts to avoid the police must be such
as to allow a rational conclusion that flight indicated a consciousness of guilt,”
and such conclusion “can only be drawn if there is evidence permitting a
reasonable inference that (1) the suspect knew the police were present and (2)
the police believed that the suspect was aware of police presence.” Kreps, 650
N.W.2d at 644 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Moreover, it appears the
court in Kreps applies this standard when flight is the only grounds for the
14

detention. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 643 (“The difficult question here is whether
such flight in and of itself justifies an investigatory stop.”). In this case, Padilla’s
detention was not based upon flight alone, but was also based on his conduct in
the alley and the fact he was found in the bushes. Nevertheless, applying the
two-part test from Kreps, there was evidence from which a reasonable inference
could be drawn that Padilla knew the police were present and that the police
believed he was aware of their presence.
The district court noted Padilla’s contention that he was unaware that
Officer Gonzales was a member of law enforcement and was driving a marked
patrol car. (R., p.58.) The court, however, found this testimony was not credible,
specifically noting other testimony in which Padilla stated:
I don’t recall any cards being on me ‘cause the cards I found on the
ground were in one pocket, and when I was laying in the bushes, I
thought I was trying to make sure I didn’t have nothing on me in
case I got found. I mean, it wasn’t—I had a misdemeanor warrant
for a misdemeanor DUI at that time also, so I was panicking. I
didn’t want to pick up more charges because I thought I might have
some weed on me. So I felt—I tossed everything that I thought I
didn’t want found on me into the bushes.
(R., p.59 (quoting Tr., p.41, L.25 – p.42, L.9 (emphasis original).) Thus, the
district court concluded: “The relationship between the officer’s presence and
Padilla’s flight was causal rather than coincidental, shows a consciousness of
guilt, and justifies an investigatory detention for someone running from the police
at 2 A.M. and jumping over fences.” (R., p.59.)
Padilla contends the district court’s findings “do not support a conclusion
that [he] knew the police were present or that the police believed that [he] was
aware of their presence.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.) According to Padilla, this is
15

so because “[a] finding that [he] ‘could have’ seen the police car is not the same
as a finding that he did see the car and recognized it as such.” (Appellant’s Brief,
p.13.) In addition to the fact that this argument misstates the court’s finding given
that the court did not say “could have,” it said “could see,” the argument ignores
that the Kreps test only requires evidence from which the court can draw a
reasonable inference that Padilla knew the police were present, not a finding that
Padilla in fact saw “the car and recognized it as such.” Padilla’s complaint that
the court did not find that Padilla in fact recognized Officer Gonzales suffers from
the same flaw. (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)
Padilla also argues that the district court failed to make a finding that
“Officer Gonzales believed that Mr. Padilla knew that he was a police officer.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14.) This argument ignores the entire point of the district
court’s factual findings that Officer Gonzales “turned his vehicle so that Padilla
could see that it was a clearly marked police car,” that “Padilla ‘turned and
looked’ at [Officer] Gonzales as he was getting out of his police car,” and that
Officer “Gonzales shouted at Padilla several times to stop.” (R., p.55.)
With respect to the court’s findings regarding Padilla’s other behavior, in
addition to his flight, Padilla complains that he “has searched the record and
cannot find any statement anywhere from Officer Gonzales that Mr. Padilla was
‘shuffling,’” and further complains that “even assuming [he] was shuffling,
whatever that means, and fumbling in his own neighborhood in the night, that is
not indicative of a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14.) Padilla is incorrect.
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At trial, Officer Gonzales testified that “as [Padilla] entered the alley, he
walked a short ways down, did some shuffling, some fumbling around, while
he was in the alley, came out of the alley and began walking southbound again
on the sidewalk.” (#41773, Exhibit 15 (#38899 Tr., p.73, Ls.5-10) (emphasis
added).)

The trial transcript was admitted at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing (R., pp.146-17, 150; Exhibit 15), and was considered by the district court
in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law (see R., p.55). Padilla’s
attempts to parse through the court’s findings and evaluate them individually
ignores the applicable legal standard for determining whether the totality of the
circumstances supports a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion.
Padilla’s complaints that the district court’s factual findings were
insufficient to support its conclusion that there was reasonable articulable
suspicion to support Padilla’s detention fail.
Padilla also challenges the district court’s determination that the items
Padilla abandoned would not be subject to suppression. (Appellant’s Brief, p.17.)
More specifically, Padilla argues that by laying in the bushes, he submitted to
Officer Gonzales, and by throwing the items after he was in the bushes, their
abandonment was involuntary. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.17-18.) This argument fails
for two reasons. First, “laying” in the bushes hardly constitutes submission to an
officer’s show of authority. Even accepting Padilla’s claim that he fell there, as
found by the district court (R., p.55), he was not submitting to law enforcement by
continuing to lay there after he fell. Indeed, as Officer Timothy Schlund testified
at trial, he found Padilla laying there only after searching the area, not because
17

Padilla submitted to his authority. (#38899 Tr., p.59, Ls.7-15, p.61, Ls.17-25.)
And, Padilla himself testified at the evidentiary hearing that he stopped because
he “was hurt,” not because the police stopped him. (Tr., p.40, Ls.20-23.) It is
hard to fathom how the police could seize Padilla from the moment he went into
the bushes given that the police were not even present at that time.
Second, there is no evidence that Padilla discarded any items as a result
of police misconduct. Padilla testified that he threw the items after he was in the
bushes because he “was trying to make sure [he] didn’t have nothing on [him] in
case [he] got found.”

(Tr., p.41, L.25 – p.42, L.4.)

It is obvious from this

statement that he threw the items before the police discovered him under the
bushes. The police did not engage in any misconduct that would render this act
of abandonment involuntary. To the contrary, the act was an entirely voluntary
effort by Padilla to distance himself from incriminating evidence “in case [he] got
found.”
Finally, Padilla contends the district court erred in finding there was
probable cause to arrest him. (Appellant’s Brief, p.18.) This entire argument
appears to be premised on the assertion that the seizure was “unconstitutional.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.18.)

For the reasons already stated, Padilla’s unlawful

seizure claim fails. As such, his probable cause argument necessarily fails.
The district court correctly concluded that Padilla failed to prove trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. Padilla has failed
to show otherwise.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
judgment dismissing Padilla’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 9th day of February, 2016.
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